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SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1960
THE EFFECT ON FUTURE INTERESTS OF A
WIDOW'S ELECTION AGAINST THE WILL
By JEROLD D. CUMMINSt
This note was awarded the first prize of $150 in the 1960 writing
competition sponsored by the Denver Clearing House Association
Trust Officers.
Colorado law provides that no person can devise or bequeath
away from his surviving spouse more than half of his estate with-
out invoking his spouse's right to take a statutory share of one-
half of the estate.1 This is an enlargement on the common law
dower and curtesy and undoubtedly creates a greater incentive for
renunciation of the will. The incentive is heightened when the will
creates for the surviving widow an estate for life or other interest
of restricted alienability and duration. Since a life estate is not
considered by the courts to be equivalent to a one-half interest in
the whole estate,2 there is going to be the problem of what effects
will follow if the widow should elect to take against the will.
Let us take two examples which have arisen in cases before the
Colorado Supreme Court. The first is pertinent to the problem even
though a surviving widow is not involved.
(1) The settlor created a living trust whereby he left a substan-
tial portion of his property to different members of his family. Part
of the income was to be paid to his son H for life and upon his
death to the son's wife L for her life on the condition that she and
her husband had not separated during the son's lifetime. After the
wife's death the income was to be paid per stirpes to the lawful issue
of H, but if there be no such issue living (or if living, extinction
should occur before the termination of the trust), then the income
was to be paid to A, B, and C. Before H died he and his wife were
divorced. H died leaving L and their children. L disclaimed any
interest in the life estate. The question was whether the income
should be paid to the children immediately or be held in suspense
until the death of L. The court held that even though the only
provision in the trust for paying the income to the children was
on L's death, the children's interest would be accelerated and the
income paid to them immediately. They declared that the prior
estate failed because of the disclaimer and because L did not survive
H as his widow. This is the only Colorado decision" recognizing
acceleration of future interests.
(2) Testator left one-half of his estate to his wife for life and
remainder to his brother and sister and the three children of a
former marriage. The residue of the estate he gave to A. The
widow elected to take a statutory one-half. It was apparently
assumed by all parties that the remainders were accelerated since
no issue was made of the matter. The question was whether A's
interest should be abated one-half to provide for the widow's forced
share. The court held that the abatement should effect all legacies
t Mr. Cummins is a senior student at the University of Denver College of Low.
1 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 152-5-5 (1953).
2 E.g., Wolfe v. Mueller, 46 Colo. 335, 104 Pac. 437 (1909).
3 Brunton v. International Trust Co., 114 Colo. 298, 164 P. 2d 472 (1945).
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proportionately and that A's interest would be reduced by fifty
percent.4  Query: Did this result in equal abatement? The testator
gave the remaindermen less than a half interest since their interests
were preceded by a life estate. Upon renunciation of the preceding
interest their interests were greatly magnified before they were
abated one-half. Other states, under such circumstances, have
ordered the life estate to be seized by a court-appointed trustee or
receiver and sequestered for the benefit of all disappointed legatees.)
Other cases in the Colorado reports appear to present similar oppor-
tunities for sequestration and yet the legatees never brought that
remedy to the court's attention." As will be shown later, not only
is sequestration recognized as a common law remedy in other juris-
dictions, but Colorado has always had a statute which undoubtedly
gives such relief.7 Its use has been confined to questions of contribu-
tion between legacies,8 and, as in the above case, it has been over-
looked as a means of providing more equitable relief for disap-
pointed legatees when a widow 9 renounces her life interest in favor
of a statutory share.
Acceleration and sequestration arise in situations other than
when a widow elects against a will, but this is by far the more
common situation. 0 This article will attempt to predict how the
Colorado courts will treat various types of future interests when
the testator's plans have been frustrated by his widow's renuncia-
tion of a carefully drawn will. The basic questions to be kept in
mind are (1) whether the interest is one which is traditionally
accelerated upon the disclaimer of the preceding life estate, and
(2) if it does appear to be of that type, do the circumstances warrant
the equitable relief of sequestration for the disappointed legatees?
ACCELERATION: THEORETICAL ASPECTS
Although it is true that the term "acceleration" is often used
by the courts when the life tenant dies before the testator, there
is no problem in this type of situation because the will itself pro-
vides that the "remainder" shall become possessory upon the death
of the life tenant. Actually there never was a remainder for the
4 Binkley v. Swiltzer, 69 Colo. 176, 192 Pac. 500 (1920).
5 Dean v. Hart, 62 Ala. 308 (1878); Bank of Statesboro v. Futch, 164 Go. 181, 138 S.E. 60
(1927); Campbell v. Campbell, 380 III. 22, 42 N.E. 2d 547 (1942). Timberlake v. Parish's Ex'r, 35 Ky.
(5 Dana) 345 (1837); Adams v. Legroo, 111 Me. 302, 89 AtI. 63 (1913); Hinkley v. House of Refuge,
17 Am. Rep. 617, 40 Md. 461 (1874); Firth v. Denny, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 468 (1861); Sellick v. Sellick,
207 Mich. 194, 173 N.W. 609 (1919); Cotton v. Fletcher, 81 N.H. 243, 123 AtI. 889 (1924); Holdren v.
Holdren, 78 Ohio St. 276, 85 N.E. 537 (1908); In re Lonegran's Estate, 303 Pa. 142, 154 AtI. 387
(1931); Meek v. Trotter, 133 Tenn. 145, 180 S.W. 176 (1915); Jones v. Knappen, 63 Vt. 391, 22 AtI.
630 (1891); McReynolds v. Counts, 50 Va. (9 Grat.) 242 (1852). Contra, Capron v. Capron, 6 Mackey
340 (D.C. 1888); Union Trust Co. v. Rossi, 180 Ark. 552, 22 S.W.2d 370 (1929); Sherman v. Baker,
20 R.I. 446, 40 Ati. 11 (1898).
6 Logan v. Logan, 11 Colo. 44, 17 Pac. 99 (1887); Brinkley v. Switzer, 69 Colo. 176, 192 Par.
500 (1920); Peterson v. Stitzer, 103 Colo. 529, 87 P.2d 745 (1939).
7 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 152-14-10 (1953), provides: "In all cases where a surviving spouse shall
renounce all benefits under the will and the legacies and bequests therein contained to other per-
sons shall in consequence thereof become increased or diminished io amount, quantity, or value, it
shall be the duty of the court upon the settlement of such estate to abate from or add to such
legacies and bequests in such manner as to equalize the loss sustained or advantage derived
thereby in a corresponding ratio to the several amounts of such legacies and bequests according to
the intrinsic value of each."
8 Hart v. Hart, 95 Colo. 471, 37 P.2d 754 (1934); Binkley v. Switzer, 69 Colo. 176, 192 Pac. 500
(1920); Wolf v. Mueller, 46 Colo. 335, 104 Par. 487 (1909); Logan v. Logan, 11 Colo. 44, 17 Pac. 99
(1887).
9 The term "widow" will be used throughout this article. The statutes equally apply to a
widower.
10 For full treatment of acceleration and sequestration in all their aspects, see 2 Simes & Smith,
Future Interests, ch. 25 (2nd ed. 1956); Restatement, Property k§ 231-236 (1944); and the Appendix
to the Restatement of Property: "Aspects of the Law of Acceleration and Sequestration" written by
Professor Richard R. Powell, Reporter of the American Law Institute for the Restatement of Property.
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reason that what appears to be a remainder upon reading the will,
was never preceded by a freehold estate which took effect. Accel-
eration also occurred at common law in England and some Ameri-
can states when the life tenant forfeited his interest" (by treason,
felony, or tortious conveyance) or merged his estate with the next
succeeding vested interest.12 These two situations-forfeiture and
merger-have a different effect than other types of failure of the
life estate. The law has always regarded a merger or forfeiture to
occur after the life estate had been conveyed or devised. If the
remainder is a vested remainder, it will immediately become pos-
sessory since it was ready to take seisin "whenever and however
the preceding freehold estates determine."''I3 On the other hand, if
it was a contingent remainder in land the law at one time held that
it must fail and be destroyed forever.14 This was because the con-
tingent remainder could not become possessory until the condition
precedent had occurred. If it had not occurred'- and if there was
no other future interest to fill the gap in seisin, the land necessarily
reverted to the grantor or his successor in interest, and it would
require a new conveyance to take it away from him.
In contrast to this, when a life estate failed for any other reason,
such as disclaimer or renunciation, the harshness of the rule was
avoided by the fiction of "relation back" whereby the court looked
upon the renunciation as having occurred at the moment of the
testator's death.' 6 The effect is just the same as if the life tenant
had died before the testator. The will was construed as though the
life estate had never existed"7 and, thus, the remainder interest is
treated as a present interest. It has been held in Colorado that a
renunciation of a life estate does not take with it the remainder
which is limited thereon.'
11 Archer's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 66b, 76 Eng, Rep. 146 (1598).
12 Craig v. Warner, 5 Mackey 460 (D.C. 1887); Blocker v. Blocker, 103 Fla. 285, 137 So. 249
(1931). These cases and Archer's Case, supro 11, involve reversionary interests which were accele-
rated to present possession.
13 This is the classic definition of a vested remainder. Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities § 9
(4th ed. 1942).
14 Blocker v. Blocker, 103 Fla. 285, 137 So. 249 (1931); Archer's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 66b, 76 Eng.
Rep. 146 (1598).
15 If it had occurred, then it would no longer be a contingent remainder, but a vested remainder.
16 Of course, equitable contingent remainders were never subject to the rule of destructibility, so
there was never any reason for the fiction of "relation back" for them. Nevertheless the courts have
applied the fiction to them also. See, e.g., Mayhew v. Atkinson, 93 F. Supp. 754 (D.C.D.C. 1950).
17 Dean v. Hart, 62 Ala. 308 (1878); Union Trust Co. v. Rossi, 180 Ark. 552, 22 S.W.2d 370 (1929);
Wallace v. Wallace, 118 Fla. 844, 160 So. 377 (1935); Rench v. Rench, 184 Iowa 1372, 169 N.W. 667
(1918); Citizens-Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Palumbo, 290 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1956); Wood's Adm'r v.
Wood's Devisees, 58 Ky. (1 Metc.) 512 (1859); Cockey v. Cockey, 141 Md. 373, 118 Ati. 850 (1922);
Rose v. Rose, 126 Miss. 114, 88 So. 513 (1921); McCollum v. McCollum, 108 Neb. 82, 187 N.W. 783
(1922); Davidson v. Savings & Trust Co., 129 Ohio St. 418, 195 N.E. 845 (1935).
18 Binkley v. Switzer, 69 Colo. 176, 192 Pac. 500 (1920).
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Although acceleration has been defined by one authority as a
"hastening of the owner of the future interest toward a status of
present possession,"'19 this is technically an inaccurate picture when
applied to cases of renunciation. Under the doctrine of "relation
back" the interest was a present interest the moment the testator
died. For all practical purposes, though, it is helpful to look at it
as it happened in reality, that is, there was a future interest until
the life estate was renounced. Therefore when it is said that a
vested remainder is accelerated, what is meant is that what would
have been a vested remainder, had not the life estate been dis-
claimed, is now a present interest. If the interest is what would
ordinarily be called a contingent remainder and the court does not
accelerate it for some reason, it is properly called an executory
interest.
2 0
The majority of decisions justify acceleration on the theory that
it best carries out the testator's intention, or at least his probable
intention.21 In this respect it resembles the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation which has developed in the law of wills. "If the
testator had known that the new will would be ineffective, would
he have intended to revoke the old one?" is not much different than
"if the testator had known the life estate would be ineffective would
he have intended to use the language he did?" The law of accelera-
tion involves so many varying circumstances, just as the circum-
stances surrounding the revocation of a will, that the answer de-
pends on how the court thinks the testator would change his will
if he were alive. The courts will go to great lengths to reconstruct
the probable intent of the testator. In one case acceleration was
allowed upon the widow's renunciation even though the will said
"It is my desire that no part of my real estate be disposed of until
after the death of my wife. '
22
Under this theory of probable intent, most vested remainders
will be accelerated and even many contingent remainders will be
accelerated. The usual case is one in which a life estate is given
to the wife "and upon her death the estate shall go to my children."
Although there is a technical condition precedent attached to the
vesting of the remainder-the death of the widow-the courts will
either interpret this to be a vested remainder and the words "upon
her death" as superfluous, 2' or they will look at it as a contingent
remainder with the implied condition precedent "upon her death
or other termination of the life estate. '24 Since the condition prece-
dent has been fulfilled, the remainder becomes a present estate.
Of course this is really the same thing as a vested remainder since
a condition precedent "whenever the prior estate terminates" ful-
fills the definition of a vested remainder. Even when the remainder
19 2 Simes & Smith, Future Interests at 263 (2nd ed. 1956).
20 Wakefield v. Wakefield, 256 In. 296, 100 N.E. 275 (1912). In Grossan v. Grossan, 303 Mo.
572, 580, 262 S.W. 701, 705 (1924) the court said: "It is suggested that the devise . . . was a
contingent remainder, and that the nullification of the particular estate destroyed the remainder.
That is true. It destroyed the remainder, as such. It did not destroy the devise to the daughters as
such."
21 See, e.g., Cotten v. Fletcher, 81 N.H. 243, 123 AtI. 889 (1924).
22 Union Trust Co. v. Rossi, 180 Ark. 552, 22 S.W.2d 370 (1929).
23 Doe v. Considine, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 458 (1867); Minnig v. Batdorff, 5 Pa. 503 (1887); American
Trust Co. v. Johnson, 236 N.C. 594, 73 S.E.2d 468 (1952).
24 Union Trust Co. v. Rossi, 180 Ark. 552, 22 S.W.2d 370 (1929); Vance's Estate, 141 Pa. 261, 21
AtI. 643 (1891). But cf. Lovell v. Town of Charlestown, 66 N.H. 584, 32 AtI. 160 (1891) where the
court refused to accelerate a vested remainder because "upon my wife's death" seemed to the court
to mean that the remainderman was rot to take until her death.
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is clearly contingent - e.g., to A for life and upon his death to B
if he then be living - the courts will often accelerate B's remainder
even though there is no assurance that he will survive A.2 5 Thus
the principle of acceleration is not merely an operation of law that
affects only vested remainders. Rather it is a way of reconstructing
the testator's will, the scheme of which has been upset by the
widow's election. In some .areas of the law, the distinction between
vested remainders and contingent remainders is important, but in
view of the fact that the courts accelerate remainders according to
the particular circumstances of each case the distinction is not
important. 26 Nevertheless, for the purpose of analysis it is con-
venient to classify the situations into five groups.
REMAINDER VESTED INDEFEASIBLY
By the great weight of authority, vested remainders that are
not subject to divestment will be accelerated upon renunciation of
the life estate.2 1 When there are unusual circumstances the courts
have refused to accelerate a vested remainder. Thus where a re-
nounced life estate was an equitable interest under a trust and there
were other life estates concurrent with the renounced interest,
courts have refused to accelerate part of the remainders to fill in
the gap left by the renounced interest. To work an acceleration,




When the future interest is subject to a condition precedent
the courts have encountered some difficulty in establishing a set
rule as to what kind shall be accelerated and what kind shall not.
The Restatement takes the view that no acceleration should take
place "so long as a condition precedent to such succeeding interest
continues unfulfilled."- 9 However, it recognizes that as a rule of
construction, language which would ordinarily be construed as
creating a condition precedent should be reconstrued in light of
the renunciation.3 1 With this in mind a court may come to the
conclusion that the testator's intention would best be aided by
accelerating the interest. Thus a description of the persons to take
after the life estate as the "surviving children" or "those children
as are living upon my wife's death" has often been interpreted by
the courts to refer to those that will survive the termination of
the life estate no matter how it ends and not necessarily the ter-
mination of the widow's life. In Scotten v. Moore 3 ' the testator
gave all his estate to his wife for life and after her death to "my
25 Mayhew v. Atkinson, 93 F. Supp. 753 (D.C.D.C. 1950); Northern Trust Co. v. Wheaton, 249 III.
606, 94 N.E. 980 (1911); Citizens-Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Palumbo, 290 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1956).
26 Scotten v. Moore, 28 Del. 545, 93 AtI. 373 (1914); Nelson v. Meade, 129 Me. 61, 149 Ati. 626
(1930); American National Bank v. Chaplin, 130 Va. 1, 107 S.E. 636 (1921). Contra, Sueske v. Scho-
field, 376 III. 431, 34 N.E.2d 399 (1941); Schaffenacker v. Beil, 320 Ill. 31, 150 N.E. 333 (1925).
27 Mayhew v. Atkinson, 93 F. Supp. 753 (D.C.D.C. 1950) (one remainder was vested, the other
contingent. Both were accelerated.); Bank of Statesboro v. Futch, 164 Ga. 181, 138 S.E. 60 (1927);
Allen v. Hannum, 15 Kan. 625 (1875); Adams v. Legroo, Ill Me. 302, 89 AtI. 63 (1913); Sherman v.
Baker, 20 R.I. 446, 40 AtI. 11 (1898); In re Borchert's Will, 259 Wis. 361, 48 N.W.2d 496 (1951).
28Toombs v. Spratlin, 127 Go. 766, 97 Atl. 1044 (1907); Windsor v. Bornet, 201 Iowa 1226, 207
N.W. 362 (1926); United States Trust Co. of New York v. Douglass, 143 Me. 150, 56 A.2d 633 (1948);
Plympton v. Plympton, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 178 (18631; Roe's Executors v. Roe, 21 N.J. Eq. 253 (1871);
In re Reighard's Estate, 253 Pa. 43, 97 Ati. 1044 (1916). But cf. Loew's Estate, 291 Pa. 22, 139 Atl.
582 (1927). Where the remaindermen ore also the holders of the concurrent life estates, no harm will
result upon acceleration. Randall v. Randall, 85 Md. 430, 37 AtI. 209 (1897); Wyllner's Estate, 65 Pa.
Super. Ct. 396 (1917).
29 Restatement, Property 1 233 (1944).
30 Id. comment c.
31 28 Del. 545, 93 Ati. 373 (1914).
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then living children (or in case of their death to their legal repre-
sentatives) share and share alike." The court held that the principle
of acceleration is based on the presumed intention of the testator,
and that there need be no distinction made between vested and
contingent remainders. The court reasoned that when it appears
that possession by the remainderman is postponed solely for the
benefit of the widow, it is presumably the intention of the testator
that her renunciation is equivalent to her death.
32
When the condition precedent is of a nature that something
more than the mere termination of the life estate is required, there
will be no acceleration. Thus when T gave property to his wife for
life and the remainder to his daughters, provided they shall tenderly
care for the widow for the rest of her life, there was no acceleration
upon the widow's renunciation since the testator intended the post-
ponement of the remainders to depend on their taking care of his
wife.3 3
REMIAINDERS VESTED SUBJECT TO COMPLETE DEFEASANCE
Most of the cases of this classification are construed in the same
way that contingent remainders are construed. There is not much
difference between "to A for life and then to B if living; if not
living then to C" and "to A for life and then to B; but if B does not
survive A, then to C." In the first example the remainder to B is
contingent; in the second example the remainder is vested subject
to complete defeasance. It would seem that a remainder of this
type should be accelerated since it is highly probable that the
testator made alternative dispositions which were dependent on
B's being alive at the termination of the life estate so he could
personally be benefited. Since the life estate has been removed, B
should be able to take possession. There is substantial authority
that such a limitation should be accelerated and become indefeas-
ible .3 4 Some courts have taken a middle road and have accelerated
the remainders but subjected them to divestment should the re-
mainderman not survive the life tenant.3 5 Colorado apparently
32 See also Mayhew v. Atkinson, 93 F. Supp. 753 (D.C.D.C. 1950) (step children who may be
living); Dean v. Hart, 62 Ala. 308 (1878) (gift to wife and daughter iointly for life, survivor to take
the whole. On death of both, remainder to heirs of the daughter. Held, daughter took whole of life
estate even though not yet the "survivor."); Equitable irust Co. v. Proctor, 27 Del. Ch. 151, 32 A.2d
422 (1943); Tomb v. Bardo, 153 Kan. 766, 114 P.2d 320 (1941) (nieces and nephews then living);
O'Rear v. Bogie, 157 Ky. 666, 163 S.W. 1107 (1914) (to descendants of life tenant as in intestacy);
Eastern Trust & Banking Co. v. Edmunds, 133 Me. 450, 179 Aft. 716 (1935) (grandson if living).
Contra, Sueska v. Schofield, 276 III. 43, 34 N.E.2d 399 (1941) (upon death of widow to her descen-
dants if any); Schaffenacker v. Beil, 320 III. 31, 150 N.E. 333 (1925) (brothers and sisters of testator
if they be living at death of wife); Cassidy v. Padgett, 99 Ind. App. 239 (1934); Stevens' Ex'r v.
Stevens, 121 Ohio St. 490, 169 N.E. 570 (1929) (to A and B should they be living at widow's death).
33 Crossan v. Crossan, 303 Mo. 572, 262 S.W. 701 (1924). See also Wood's Adm'r v. Wood's
Devisees, 58 Ky. (I Metc.) 512 (1859) (at death of widow to J. provided he be living and has arrived
at the age of twenty-five); Brandenburg v. Thorndike, 139 Mass. 102, 28 N.E. 575 (1885) (at expira-
tion of three years from the death of wife to be distributed in equal shares to A and B); Key's
Estate, 16 Pa. Co. Ct. 216 (1895) (remainder to "heirs" of life tenant).
34 Capron v. Capron, 6 Mackey 340 (D.C. 1888); Decker v. Decker, 251 Ala. 278, 37 S0.2d 204
(1948); Union Trust Co. v. Rossi, 180 Ark. 552, 22 S.W.2d 370 (1929); Rench v. Rench, 184 Iowa 1372,
169 N.W. 667 (1918); Keen v. Brooks, 186 Md. 543, 47 A.2d 67 (1946); Young v. Eagon, 131 N.J.Eq.
574, 26 A.2d 180 (1942); Petition of Chemical Bank and Trust Co., 198 Misc. 536, 99 N.Y.S.2d 368
(1950); American Trust Co. v. Johnson, 236 N.C. 594, 73 S.E.2d 468 (1952) (court calls the remainder a
vested interest subject to divestment, but it appears to be alternative contingent remainders); In re
Disston's Estate, 257 Pa. 537, 101 AtI. 804 (1917); Albright v. Albright, 192 Tenn. 326, 241 S.W.2d
415 (1951). See also Restatement, Property § 231, comment h (1944). Contra, In re Roger's Estate, 97
Md. 674, 55 AtI. 679 (1903); Sawyer v. Freeman, 161 Mass. 543, 37 N.E. 942 (1894); In re Atkinson's
Will, 81 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Surr. 1949).
35 Hasomeier v. Welke, 309 III. 460, 141 N.E. 176 (1923); Parker v. Ross, 69 N.H. 213, 45 AtI.
-576 (1897).
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followed this rule in a case where the interests were equitable and
the trust was to continue.
3 6
CLASS GIFTS
The cases involving remainders to a class are very similar to
situations where the remainder is vested subject to complete de-
feasance. The only added question is, when does the class close if
the remainder is accelerated? It should be kept in mind that some
class gifts are contingent remainders (e.g., to A for life, and then
to his surviving children) and there may be the added problem of
construing words of condition precedent. Some courts have held
that merely because the remainder is accelerated does not require
the class to close before the death of the life tenant.3 7 But there are
problems in this solution unless the gift is land, since the trustee
or personal representative must retain enough of the corpus in case
the class should increase in size. Consequently, as a matter of con-
venience, the majority of the courts have held that acceleration
should be accompanied with the closing of the class.3 The question
has not been decided in Colorado.3 9 The Restatement is in accord
with the majority view but recognizes that manifestation of a
contrary intent will keep the class open.40  Also, of course, mani-
festation of a contrary intention may keep the remainder from
being accelerated in the first place.
EXECUTORY INTERESTS
As we have seen in the section on vested remainders subject to
complete defeasance, when an executory interest is limited upon
a vested remainder, there is the probability that acceleration of the-
remainder will destroy the executory interest. 4' A good example
of this is found in Albright v. Albright .4 2 In that case the testator
left his wife most of his estate. Some of the property, however,
was given in the form of a life estate to his wife with remainder
36 Brunton v. International Trust Co., 114 Colo. 298, 164 P.2d 472 (1945). See note 3 supro, and
the accompanying text. Afte the remainder was accelerated the trust continued. Althouugh the court
did not expressly so hold, it was implied in their decision that the interests were still subject to
divestment.
37 Askey v. Askey, 141 Neb. 406, 196 N.W. 891 (1923); Yeoton v. Roberts, 28 N.H. 459 (1854)-
Neill v. Bach, 231 N.C. 391, 57 S.E.2d 385 (1949).
38 Tomb v. Bardo, 153 Kan. 766, 114 P.2d 320 (1941); Allen v. Hannum, 15 Kan. 625 (1875);
Sherman v. Baker, 20 R.I. 446, 40 AtI. 11 (1898); American Nat. Bank v. Chapin, 130 Va. 1, 107
S.E. 636 (1921).
39 In Brunton v. International Trust Co., supra note 36, the remainder was to the issue,
(per stirpes) of the settlor's son. Upon renunciation of the preceding life estate the remainder
accelerated. The class closed of necessity since the settlor's son was dead. The class would hove
closed even if there were no acceleration.
40 Restatement, Property § 231 comment i (1944).
41 See cases collected in note 34, supro.
42 192 Tenn. 326, 241 S.W.2d 415 (1951).
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to two daughters, but if either die before their mother then their
children were to take in their place. In order to free the property
of these restrictions the widow disclaimed her life estate and agreed
with her daughters to a settlement by which they would divide
the property so that each would get a fee simple in her share. The
widow did not take her statutory share. The court held that the
disclaimer accelerated the remainders to possessory status. The
gifts over to the grandchildren were destroyed since the court
thought that the testator would not want to divest his daughters
of their interests once they had become possessory. Professor Simes
suggests that where an executory interest is of the type that divests
only a possessory interest, there should not be acceleration.43 Thus
where land is devised to A in fee simple, but if A die without issue,
then to B in fee simple absolute, B's interest should not be acceler-
ated upon A's renunciation, but would be converted from a shifting
executory interest into a springing executory interest.
GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
As will be discussed in the next section, even though there
would be ample reason to accelerate a future interest, a court may
choose to halt the acceleration and sequester the life estate on the
theory that the testator's plan would be better accomplished by
compensating those legatees who lose more than others by the
widow taking her statutory share. This exception to acceleration
applies to all types of future interests.
All the foregoing discussion has been on the assumption that the
proper theory of acceleration is that it is based on a reconstruction
of the will; that courts should not follow historically-fixed rules of
property if they can discern a contrary intention in the spirit of the
will, even though a strict interpretation of the written language
would not suggest it. They also justify their decisions on the ground
that the testator is presumed to know of his wife's right to a statu-
tory share (or dower as the case may be) and therefore must have
contemplated the possibility that the remainders would be accel-
erated. There are a few decisions that take the more realistic view
that the testator's intentions have been frustrated and the court is
merely trying to patch up remnants of the will rather than have
the testator's desires be completely frustrated by having the whole
estate pass by intestacy.
4
There is a third theory that a few courts seem to go on. It is
based on a strict common law principle that wills must be construed
literally and should not be "reconstrued" in light of subsequent
frustration. This view favors the explicit meaning of words over
judicial mind-reading. Under this theory vested remainders are
automatically accelerated where there is no preceding freehold that
ever came into existence. Contingent remainders become springing
executory interests since to accelerate them would pass over the
condition precedent as required by the language of the will.4.5 This
43 2 Simes & Smith, Future Interests at 289 (2nd ed. 1956).
44 Woodburn's Estate, 151 Pa.St. 586, 25 At. 145 (1892); In re Mcllhattan's Will, 194 Wis. 113,
216 N.W. 130 (1927). In rare circumstances the courts will declare the whole will invalid because of
the devastating effect of the widow's election. Fennell v. Fennell, 80 Kan. 730, 106 Pac. 1038 (1909);
In re Estate of Hunter, 129 Neb. 529, 262 N.W. 41 (1935).
45 Sawyer v. Freeman, 161 Mass. 543, 37 N.E. 942 (1894) in which the testator left his estate in
trust for his wife for life and at her death to be Paid to her daughter, but if the daughter be not
living at her death, then to the issue of such daughter. The court, in an opinion by Holmes, J., held
that the words "at her death" prevented acceleration. See also Stevenson v. Stevenson, 205 Ill. App.
15 (1917); Stevens v. Stevens, 121 Ohio St. 490, 169 N.E. 570 (1929); Compton v. Rixey's Executor,
124 Va. 548, 98 S.E. 651 (1919).
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view tends to penalize testators who fail to provide alternative
dispositions in case their wives elect against the will (assuming
they would have wished acceleration to take place).
SEQUESTRATION
Since every time there is an acceleration of a future interest
there is a corresponding increase in its value, it usually occurs that
some other legatee or devisee loses a larger part of his gift than he
would otherwise. In most states this occurs most often to a resid-
uary legatee since the personal representatives will take his share
to pay all claims before other gifts are abated. 46 This rule of abate-
ment is changed in Colorado because of section 152-14-10 of the
1953 Colorado Revised Statutes.4 7 This statute has been interpreted
to mean proportionate abatement regardless of whether the differ-
ent legacies are specific, general, or residual . 4 The words "legacies
and bequests" should be taken to include devises of real property."
The statute is of little effect, however, if after the proper abatement,
a remainder is increased in value by its acceleration, thus decreas-
ing the percentage of its share of the abatement. This would be
proper if the testator intended such a result, but many testators
would probably have meant for the other legatees to receive more
than they would get if acceleration is allowed. There are situations,
of course, where acceleration would not deprive anyone of his just
proportion. Thus where the entire estate is given to the wife for life
with the remainder over, acceleration will not distort the testatmen-
tary scheme no matter how many persons have an interest in the
remainder. Also when the remaindermen are the beneficiaries of all
the other gifts other than the wife's, there will be no distortion.
Where substantial distortion can occur is given by the follow-
ing hypothetical situation: Testator having an estate worth $100,000
leaves $50,000 to his child A by a former marriage and the residue
he leaves to his present wife for life with the remainder to her
daughter B, the testator's stepchild. The wife's life estate is present-
46 See, e.g., Pace v. Pace, 271 III. 114, 110 N.E. 878 (1915).
47 Supra note 7.
48 This interpretation has often been repeated, but always is dictum. See Hart v. Hart, 95 Colo.
471, 37 P.2d 754 (1934) where all gifts were specific legacies, but the language used by the court was
broader; Binkley v. Switzer, 69 Colo. 176, 192 Pac. 500 (1920) where all gifts abated pro rata, but
all were of same class; Logan v. Logan, 11 Colo. 44, 17 Pac. 99 (1887) where gifts were of same class,
but the court said: " . .. all legacies and bequests (which words include devises of real estate)
are to be equalized under the statutory provisions." at 50, 192 Pac. at 102.
49 Logan v. Logan, supra note 47.
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ly worth, let us say, $20,000 and the remainder, $30,000. If the wife
renounces and takes her $50,000 statutory share, then both the pe-
cuniary gift to A and the remainder to B will abate one-half. A is
entitled to $25,000 at this point and B will get $15,000. There is still
the life estate to be disposed of. If the remainder is accelerated then
B will receive $25,000 which represents a net reduction of only
16 2/3%. The other child's gift remains at a reduction of 50%. If in-
stead of acceleration, the widow's life estate is sequestered for the
benefit of disappointed legatees (in this case both A and B, since in
Colorado all legacies are abated equally) the estate would be more
equitably distributed. The doctrine of sequestration is widely rec-
ognized in this type of situation.51t The courts will appoint a trustee
to receive the income from the life estate and pay it to the legatees
in proportion to their interests. Thus, in this case, A would get five-
eighths of the income and B would get three-eighths. When the
widow dies, her daughter or her daughter's successor in interest will
receive the property in fee simple absolute.
The same result should follow if B's interest was a contingent
remainder that would not normally accelerate, for instance "to my
wife for life and then to my daughter on the condition that they take
care of my wife for the rest of her natural life." Since there would
be no aceleration, the renounced life estate should be sequestered in
the same manner. In this case sequestration is not used to alleviate
distortion between legacies, but simply to compensate disappointed
legatees. Otherwise the life estate would pass into the residuary
fund or go by intestacy.
It would seem from the language of section 152-14-10 that the
common law doctrine of sequestration should be used whenever a
widow's election deprives a beneficiary of part or all of his gift if it
can be made up to him by using the renounced interest. If the wid-
ow renounced a legacy of property in fee simple, the other legatees
would share in the property to compensate for the reduction in the
whole estate. The same result should follow if what is renounced is
a life estate. The statute expressly orders the court to equalize the
losses (and not merely abate) acording to the value of the legacies.
A few courts have invented an alternative remedy that reaches
the same result that sequestration does. In Tomb v. Bardol the
court accelerated the remainder and placed a charge on the real
property to compensate disappointed legatees. It should be noted
that this proceeds on a different theory than where a court, after
paying the widow her share, distributes the residuary property with
a charge placed on it in favor of other legatees or claimants. That is
but a method of distributing the estate, the courts going to great
lengths to find language in the will implying such a charge, and us-
ually (at least in states other than Colorado) the residuary legatee
has to bear the burden of paying off the claims including the wid-
ow's share. Since section 152-14-10 changed the common law as to
abatement, the principle used in Tomb v. Bardo would be applicable
as well as sequestration.
50 See cases collected in note 5 supro.
51 153 Kan. 766, 114 P.2d 320 (1941). Simes states that this is the only case where this remedy
has been used. 2 Simes & Smith, Future Interests at 297 (2nd ed. 1956). He overlooks the early
cases of Allen v. Hannum, 15 Kan. 625 (1875); Sarles v. Sarles, 19 Abb. N.Cas. 322 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1887); Meek v. Trotter, 133 Tenn. 145, 180 S.W. 176 (1915).
SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1960
The Restatement originally favored only sequestration, but
after the above case was decided it was amended to read: "Whether
sequestration or charge is used for the minimizing of distortion de-
pends upon the judicial choice as to which remedy is more effi-
cient. ' '52 Although sequestration is the more common relief given,
it is submitted that it has several weaknesses. (1) The costs of hav-
ing a court-appointed trustee or receiver to manage the life estate
is high, thus limiting the use to cases where there is great distortion
between legacies. (2) Litigation might arise should the widow out-
live her expected lifespan, since that would mean that the remand-
erman's interest was overvaluated and the other disappointed lega-
tees would demand that they should have a greater proportion of the
distributed income. (3) It is possible that the widow might live so
long that the income from her life estate would fully compensate the
abated legacies. The question would then arise as to who should get
this income. These problems are eliminated if Tomb v. Bardo is
followed and the remainders are accelerated subject to an equitable
charge. Thus: testator devises Blackacre (worth $100,000) to his
wife for life and remainder to his daughter A, and the residue of his
property (worth $30,000) to son B. If the wife elects to take her
statutory one-half, the two gifts abate proportionately and she
would get one-half to Blackacre and $15,000. The remainder in the
other half of Blackacre is accelerated and charged with an amount
to satisfy the disappointed legatees. At this point it is important to
recognize that both A and B are disappointed legatees. Thus the
charge on Blackacre should be just enough to give B a proper share
of the increased value given to the remainder by acceleration. This
increased value must be calculated according to the widow's life ex-
pectancy, i.e., what the life estate would be worth had she not re-
nounced it. If this were calculated to be worth $30,000 then the re-
mainder would be worth about $70,000. Out of every dollar increase
due to acceleration, 30% should go to B and 70% to A, because such
is the ratio of the intrinsic value '13 of the orginal gifts, i.e., a $70,000
remainder to A and a legacy of $30,000 to B. A charge of $9000 (30%
of the value of the life estate) should be placed on A's half of Black-
acre to be paid to B. This device avoids the expense of having the
court administer the life estate and settles the question of the ratio
52 Restatement Property f 234, comment aa (1949 amendment to 1944 ed.).
53 ". . it shall be the duty of the court . . . to abate from or add to such legacies . . . to
equalize the loss sustained . . . in a corresponding ratio to the several amounts of such legacies
and bequests according to the intrinsic value of each." Colo. Rev. Stat. 152-14-10 (1953).
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of distribution once and for all by the use of mortality tables in es-
timating the value of the life estate.
Although there is no Colorado decision on the subject of seques-
tration, there is persuasive authority in favor of such relief by vir-
tue of the fact that section 152-14-10 was taken54 directly from an
Illinois statute that has been construed several times by the courts
of that state. (These Illinois decisions were written after the Colo-
rado statute was enacted, but the Colorado Supreme Court has
strongly relied on subsequent decisions of Illinois courts in constru-
ing this same statute in relation to another question.)5 5 The Illinois
courts have interpreted the statute to require sequestration of a re-
nounced life estate for the benefit of disappointed legatees. In Wake-
field v. Wakefield" the testator bequeathed pecuniary gifts to a
number of individuals. He gave his wife a life estate in all the rest
of his property and provided that at the death of the wife, $2000 was
to be paid to A if he was then living. All the rest went to the chil-
dren of B and the children of C in equal shares. The widow elected
to take her statutory share. The court held that the statute required
the life estate to be sequestered to equalize the disappointed lega-
tees. Since the remainder was contingent there might not have been
an acceleration even in the absence of sequestration, but in Conant
v. Elgin City Banking Co. 5 T the court expressly held that a vested
remainder would not be accelerated if sequestration was required
to equalize the losses. In other cases the Illinois courts have held
that where the remainder is subject to a condition precedent other
than the termination of the life estate, sequestration is in order.
Iowa is the only other state which has a statute controlling
abatement on a widow's renunciation. 59 Although the Iowa statute
is not identical in wording to the Colorado and Illinois statutes, it
provides that the amount of any claim that must be satisfied in op-
position to or in disregard of the provisions of the will must be
taken ratably from the interests of the heirs, devisees, and legatees.
This has been construed to provide for sequestration of a life estate
when a widow elects against the will. The leading case is Bening v.
Eischeid60 in which the testator left his estate in trust with income
up to $600 per year to be paid to his wife for life; any additional in-
come to be paid to A and B. Upon the widow's death the trust was
to terminate and the property to pass in the following ratio: one-
third to C and two-thirds to A and B. The widow renounced her life
54 Logan v. Logan, 11 Colo. 44, 17 P.c. 99 (1887).
55 Id. at 49, 17 Pac. at 101. The question was whether the entire will was destroyed by the
renunciation of the widow. The court said: "Were this a new question, as counsel suggests, we
would not only deem the foregoing interpretation duly authorized by the reasons and considerations
given, but consider it the duty of the court to accept it as the more reasonable construction. It is,
however, not a new question . . . . Since the appropriation of that section by our legislature . . .
the supreme court of Illinois has decided that a will is not destroyed . . . by the renunciation of the
widow, but that all legacies and bequests (which words are construed to include devises of real
estate) are to be equalized under this statutory provision. Marvin v. Ledwith, 111 III. 144." The
identical Illinois statute was Hurd's Rev. St. 1921, ch. 3, § 78. In 1939 the wording of the statute
was changed but the Illinois court held that it did not alter the effect whatsoever. In re Reighard's
Estate, 402 Ill. 364, 84 N.E. 2d 345 (1949). The present Illinois act can be found in Ill. Rev. Stat.
1959, ch. 3, 9 202.
56 256 III. 296, 100 N.E. 275 (1912).
57 232 III. App. 156 (1924). See also Pillsbury v. Early, 252 III. App. 620 (1929).
58 Campbell v. Campbell, 380 III. 22, 42 N.E.2d 547 (1942); Sueske v. Schofield, 376 III. 431, 34
N.E.2d 399 (1941); Foreman Trust & Savings Bank v. Seelenfreund, 329 Ill. 546, 161 N.E. 88 (1928);
Schaffenacker v. Beil, 320 Ill. 31, 150 N.E. 333 (1926); Blatchford v. Newberry, 99 III. 11 (1880).
All these decisions based their result on the Illinois statute which is identical to the Colorado statute.
59 Section 633.14, Code of Iowa, 1954.
60240 Iowa 1294, 39 N.W.2d 299 (1949). Cf. McGuire v. Luckey, 129 Iowa 559, 105 N.W. 1004
(1946); Shedenhelm v. Cafferty, 174 Iowa 195, 256 N.W. 340 (1916).
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estate and took a statutory third of the whole estate. The trust fund
was reduced from $71,500 to $46,000. The drop in income to be paid
A and B was 33 1/3%. But if they were allowed to receive the $600
yearly income that the widow relinguished (by the terms of the
trust they were to take all residue income, and at the same time
they owned part of the remainder interest which conceivably might
be accelerated) the net drop would only be 18%. The court held
that the $600 income could be sequestered and distributed to equal-
ize the losses suffered because of the widow's taking one-third of
the estate.61
It would seem that under the authority of these cases and the
unambiguous language of section 152-14-10, Colorado would prob-
ably apply the sequestration doctrine whenever disappointed lega-
tees were astute enough to apply to the courts for that relief. Even
when there is no distortion between legacies, as where no accelera-
tion occurs, the life estate should be sequested to compensate all
legatees for the depletion of their gifts.
61 Sequestration was in order, but the court, rather than appoint a trustee, changed the value of
the remainder interest in favor of C and awarded the income of the trust to A and B. The parties
had already stipulated as to the value of the life estate in the widow by utilizing the mortality
tables. This method of handling the distribution is similar to the method used in Tomb v. Bardo,
supra at note 50.
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